Saturday, June 28, 2008

This whole big boat is just one floating computer: CGC BERTHOLF
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

With the BERTHOLF in the Chesapeake Bay this week, Admiral Allen may have "had an incredible day on board" the BERT, but I remain puzzled.

In today's Baltimore Sun, Josh Mitchell wrote, "Newest Coast Guard ship in port: Longer than a football field, highly automated cutter Bertholf docks in Fells Point". My confusion starts 2/3 of the way through the article:

Almost every task on the ship is computer-operated, cutting down on the number of people needed to perform ordinary tasks such as launching a small boat from the ship. Even the 57-milimeter gun is reloaded with the click of a mouse.

"This whole big boat is just one floating computer," said Lt. Krystyn Pecora, the Bertholf's assistant operations officer. "For the point-and-click generation, this is the boat."

My confusion? How could the ship have been inspected prior to acceptance if there weren't any computers onboard?

Meanwhile, I'm still waiting for the requested documents which will shed light on the computers which apparently walked on and off the BERT under their own steam.

Posted on Saturday, June 28, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Friday, June 6, 2008

Interview with the National Journal: Sooner or later you have to take occupancy.
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Excellent article by James Kitfield with the National Journal and published by Government Executive.

Given problems with the Deepwater program in terms of quality control, production delays, and cost overruns, why accept delivery of the Bertholf after Navy inspectors flagged eight outstanding issues?

Taking delivery doesn't mean there aren't systems that still need tweaking, but it's like buying a house: Sooner or later you have to take occupancy. We feel that the best way to learn about the ship is to get a crew on board and assess its operational effectiveness while conducting actual missions. That way, over the next year and a half, the crew can work with the contractors to clear up any outstanding issues. I would also note that in general the inspectors' report on the Bertholf was very good. That's important, because we asked the Navy to bring their team of experienced ship inspectors in to run the evaluation. We wanted the assessment done by a third party that had no stake in the cutter, and we told them essentially to pull it through a knothole. And they commented quite favorably about the unique qualities the cutter will bring to the Coast Guard.

I love it: "Sooner or later you have to take occupancy."

Do catch the full read here.

Posted on Friday, June 06, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Thursday, May 29, 2008

The seeking of $96.1 million has stopped
Posted by Joe Coastie

You will recall CGBlog posted back in January about the CG attempting to reclaim $96.1 million for the 123' patrol boat fiasco-

The U.S. Coast Guard has asked a joint venture of Lockheed Martin Corp (and Northrop Grumman Corp to pay $96.1 million for eight patrol boats that it modified, but that cannot be used.
...
"The government is seeking $96.1 million in repayment from ICGS for the failure to deliver 123-foot patrol boats that conform to the requirements of the contract," said Coast Guard spokeswoman Laura Williams.

Well this piece on Marinelink points to an AP story stating that the Coast Guard has stopped in its venture pursuing a refund-

The U.S. Coast Guard said it will temporarily stop its review and suspend its pursuit of a $96.1m refund for faulty ships built by Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT) and Northrop Grumman Corp. (NOC), pending a Justice Department investigation. The Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General are investigating the Coast Guard's Deepwater contracts, including the eight, 123-ft. patrol boats found to have structural problems...

One of these day's something just may workout in our favor.

Posted on Thursday, May 29, 2008
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Labels: Acquisition Directorate, by Joe Coastie, Deepwater

Thursday, May 22, 2008

A Coast Guard veteran speaks out: Don’t link Coast Guard’s record to Bush
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Dennis McNish of Lake Oswego, Oregon, wrote an opinion piece published in the Lake Oswego Review today: Don’t link Coast Guard’s record to Bush. Mr. McNish wrote, in part,

The Coast Guard has for most of its recent history designed its own equipment, let the appropriate contracts and even built some of its own ships at Curtis Bay, MD. But the opportunity for Bush’s pals to make a pile of money was put ahead of the needs of the service and the nation. So the determination of what ships and aircraft were needed, the design of these units and the construction of them were handed over to a consortium of companies. That is the precise formula for mismanagement, poor performance, and corruption, which is exactly what has happened. Familiar? Today, five years later, the Coast Guard actually has fewer assets with which to accomplish its mission than it did when Deep Water was initiated.

A pile of money? Oh, say it ain't so.

A tip o' the hat to Tony. Thanks.

Posted on Thursday, May 22, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Monday, May 19, 2008

CG-9123 does not consider this blog a media outlet
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Well, good news for the Coast Guard. AN UNOFFICIAL COAST GUARD BLOG isn't media.

I guess nobody actually reads this blog. The thousand hits a day must be me and Joe Coastie checking our own posts.

Received today from Ms. Walicia L. Lee, a FOIA Specialist with CG-9123:

Mr. Stinson, I am responding to your FOIA request dated May 8, 2008, for materials related to the Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf C4ISR and Tempest system. You have requested a Fee Waiver based on this information being used for the Media; however, there is a cost associated with the processing of this FOIA.

If you desire your request to be consider for a Fee Waiver, your request would need to be submitted on a Media letterhead and resubmitted.

If you would like for me to continue processing this request, please advise and I will continue accumulating the fee's associated with the processing of your request.

Er, media letterhead? For a new media outlet?

I responded, by email:

Thanks for your note.

I reference the Coast Guard's Public Affairs Manual (COMDTINST M5728.2D ), page 2-9, which notes, "What makes a journalist a journalist is whether he or she is gathering news for dissemination to the public, not the method or medium used to publish. If a blogger or web-only outlet approaches your unit with a request for an interview or information you should look at the site to determine if it is a 'news dissemination' site." AN UNOFFICIAL COAST GUARD BLOG (http://www.cgblog.org) is a blog, web-only, news and opinion media operation. As such, we don't have "Media letterhead," which is a remnant of times past.

I request a Fee Waiver for this request. As I noted in my original request, disclosure of the information is in the public interest as it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. In addition, this request is not in my commercial interest.

Please reconsider my Fee Waiver request as my request meets the requirements as set forth in the Freedom of Information Act.

I look forward to hearing from you.

The Coast Guard ought to just post all this stuff online in the Electronic Reading Room. Then we wouldn't need to hound Ms. Lee...

Posted on Monday, May 19, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater, FOIA

Thursday, May 15, 2008

BERTHOLF's DD 250 posted online for all to see
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

I'm not sure when it was posted, but I discovered today that CG-9 has posted the Material Inspection and Receiving Report (DD250) for the BERTHOLF. Captain Patrick Stadt, signing as the Commanding Officer, accepted custody of the cutter in block 24 of the DD-250: Ship's Force Acknowledgement of Custody Transfer.

CG-9 also posted an Information Assurance Fact Sheet.

I haven't yet had time to digest all of this information, but I applaud the Coast Guard for being proactive in posting this information.

Earlier this week, David Axe at War is Boring posted Coast Guard Cutter’s Shady “Whodunit” where he said he'd been told there was some unethical actions taken in order to get the BERTHOLF a passing mark from the INSURV team. He'd been told the BERTHOLF's

communications systems had been fully installed as of this spring, but were yanked out of the ship in the weeks preceding InSurv’s visit … and then apparently re-installed after the inspectors had left.

This prompted Mr. Axe to ask three questions:

1) What were the circumstances surrounding the “un-installation” of Bertholf’s communications systems?

2) Who exactly yanked the systems, and when?

3) Who ordered the cheat, and what was their rationale?

The same rumor led me to file a FOIA request with the Coast Guard:

Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, I request access to, and electronic copies of:

1.) All inventory documents of all C4ISR equipment which has been placed on the BERTHOLF at any time from the time the keel was laid to this date.

2.) All inventory documents of all C4ISR equipment which was placed on the BERTHOLF and then removed before April 20th, 2008.

3.) A listing of all descrepencies discovered in the C4ISR and TEMPEST systems which were noted by any organization involved in the construction and evaluation of the BERTHOLF.

4.) All documents, including emails, memos, and other forms oforganizational communication concerning the placement or removal of C4ISR equipment on the BERTHOLF.

Perhaps the Coast Guard leadership will just avoid the FOIA issues and just answer all the questions simply and directly.

In the mean time, tonight's reading is the DD-250 and the Information Assurance Fact Sheet.

Posted on Thursday, May 15, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Monday, May 12, 2008

An insulting question, but one that must be answered
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

(Updated 5/12/2008 @ 1745)I recently came across a Washington Post article by Spencer S. Hsu and Renae Merle about the revolving door between government employees and government contractors. Their year-old piece, Coast Guard's Purchasing Raises Conflict-of-Interest Flags, examined the Coast Guard's Deepwater project along with policy and decision makers moving from the Coast Guard and DHS to Deepwater contractors. Deep in the article was this nugget:

Retired Coast Guard Adm. James M. Loy, who helped formulate Deepwater as the Coast Guard's commandant, said that to his knowledge "that array of players, either in their political positions, or civilian commercial positions, or in retired Coast Guard positions" has never been linked "to undue influence." Loy served two years as DHS deputy secretary, then joined Lockheed's board of directors in August 2005.

Asked whether he ever faced improper influence on Deepwater decisions, Loy said: "The question is almost insulting. I will pass on giving you any kind of answer."

Is that indignation talking... or is there something to hide?

Me, I'd just everything to be in the clear.

And, yes, I'd orginally thought this WaPo article was from this year, but one gentle reader has corrected me. This is old news, coming at us from early 2007.

Posted on Monday, May 12, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Wednesday, May 7, 2008

I almost found religion
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

There's been plenty of activity on the Coast Guard Journal recently. The latest post, a missive from Vice Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., is Ancient Mariner SITREP #4 – Visit to Pascagoula and BERTHOLF.

I was hoping for answers.

I want to talk about the cutter first. I remain extremely impressed – she’s going to be a great Coast Guard cutter, and I can’t wait to get out to sea to observe her performance underway. Captain Stadt and his shipmates (and the Navy INSURV board as well) are very impressed with BERTHOLF’s almost effortless speed and maneuvering characteristics. I am confident that improvements in weapons systems, sensors, countermeasures, flight deck characteristics and boat launching and recovery will give BERTHOLF capabilities far superior to previous cutters. Command and control, particularly as it relates to the ship’s command center will be vastly superior to almost every shore-based Coast Guard command center. Her seakeeping ability and spacious topside arrangements and damage control systems will further enhance her capabilities and the safety of her crew.

. . . .

So what is this “preliminary acceptance”? It basically amounts to a period when we take the ship and begin to put her through operational test and evaluation (OT&E). The builder continues to have responsibilities to resolve the many outstanding “punch list” items, while we get a chance to see and confirm the ship’s performance and capabilities. With lessons learned from these trials, the builder will make production improvements and enhancements to follow-on hulls that will enable us to get them out and operational on a shorter timeline (and less expensively) than the lead ship. After the “punch list” discrepancies are resolved, OT&E is completed, the C4ISR systems are fully installed and certified for operation, and contractual responsibilities are met, the Coast Guard will sign for final acceptance. In reality, this is not much different than when I had my house built – even though I moved into the house, the builder had to correct discrepancies for a year before I finally signed off with him contractually.

. . . .

Challenges remain – as they would in any lead ship that pushes for new capabilities and technology. As we preliminarily accept BERTHOLF, the INSURV inspectors and Coast Guard staff have produced a substantial worklist that will be resolved. Most notably, issues still exist with secure communications equipment. BERTHOLF carries a substantial IT backbone to enable her missions that is more complicated than any other cutter. Consequently, this gear has received, is receiving, and will receive closer scrutiny, inspection, and information assurance testing than any other Coast Guard cutter to date. These issues, along with any others that the officers and crew discover during the next year or so, will be resolved. I have testified before Congress that these issues are correctable. I was convinced then, and I remain convinced now that BERTHOLF will be ready to perform all duties when called upon.

Okay, here's one of the things I see in this Journal entry: Yes, there were and there are various issues with the C4IT suite, but we're not going actually acknowledge that the blogosphere has the story right, or at least mostly right, but we're going to just move forward and not exhume anything in the past. We're going to get it right. It just may take some time.

Am I close?

Posted on Wednesday, May 07, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Friday, May 2, 2008

Coast Guard slated to accept BERT
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Looks like the BERTHOLF received a passing score from the recent Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv) team which assessed the first National Security Cutter in April.

Philip Ewing, writing for the Navy Times, tells us National security cutter ‘capable,’ InSurv finds. Mr. Ewing also wrote,

But one key detail went unresolved — an assessment of the Bertholf’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance suite, commonly known as C4ISR. Much of the information systems gear was not yet installed when InSurv came onboard, according to the report, nor did Navy inspectors conduct full tests on the ship’s radios, although overall the communications section of the InSurv gave the highest grade, “satisfactory.”

So they didn't even look at the TEMPEST issues.

I feel the wool being pulled over my eyes.

On my recent post What's with this TEMPEST beef? Michael Dekort commented, "They figured out a way to move forward and bury the C4ISR/TEMPEST problems."

So now there is no DD-250 or waiver issue because the TEMPEST test never failed because they were never completed because all of the equipment wasn't installed? So all of the critical issues logged on the trial cards are ship issues and no C4ISR issues? So the boat gets accepted with critical communications systems that haven't completed testing because they are all not installed? I assume the CG will now buy time in this "Special Commissioning Period" of up to 2 years to fix everything?

I just have this nagging feeling that we're not hearing the whole story from the Coast Guard or Northrop Grumman.

Tell me I'm wrong, please.

Posted on Friday, May 02, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Monday, March 17, 2008

At least the Coast Guard isn't alone in "contract growth"
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Lockheed Martin plays prominently in a Washington Post article published today, Peter Baker's Cost Nearly Doubles For Marine One Fleet: Production of Craft Has Been Delayed.

The Pentagon confirmed this month that the cost of the fleet of 28 new super-sophisticated helicopters has jumped from $6.1 billion when the contract was signed in 2005 to $11.2 billion today. Outfitted with cutting-edge communications equipment, antimissile defenses and hardened hulls, each of the VH-71 helicopters, to be dubbed Marine One whenever the president is onboard, will cost $400 million -- more than the most recent Boeing 747 jetliner outfitted to serve as Air Force One when it was delivered in 1990, even when adjusted for inflation.

The problems have generated consternation in the White House, Congress and Pentagon as officials attempt to grapple with yet another military hardware purchase that has expanded beyond initial parameters.

Wow. $400 million. And we thought Deepwater was expensive.

Although Lockheed Martin does not make helicopters, the Navy chose it over longtime contractor Sikorsky Aircraft because the company's European partner had a three-engine model that seemed a logical off-the-shelf base for a new presidential helicopter. But modifying the EH101 has proven so complicated that the company is essentially building a new helicopter.

Perhaps we need more companies capable of doing this sort of work. I get the sense that with only two or three players, even if Lockheed Martin messes up, they still get more contracts, lining the pockets of high-priced executives and rich investors.

Posted on Monday, March 17, 2008
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Labels: Aviation, by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

From Deepwater to CG-9; Aviation Acquisitions going great!
Posted by Ryan R. Erickson

Officer 1: "So how is that acquisition thing going anyway?"
Officer 2: "Great!"
Officer 1: "What do you mean, Great!? I read on CGBlog that it's not going so well."
Officer 2: "Oh, you mean the afloat part of it... well that's not going to well, but I'm not worried about that, I work in aviation acquisitions- so..."
Officer 1: "Oh- So it's going good 'eh?"
Officer 2: "Well if you want to do a comparison of NSC's and HC's... oh who am I kidding, of course it going good. "

I know, that' was bad... So I'll stick to being an LE guy, for I know I couldn't be a writer. Anyhow, I thought it would be a good time to take a look at where the Coast Guards Acquisition Directorate (CG-9) stands with it's aviation acquisitions. We've read, and reported about the death of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle within the last few months. Maybe they should have taken a harder look at the Autonomous Blimp (pictured). Though you may not believe what you read, I thought it best to show you. From CG-9:

Coast Guard Research and Development Center is conducting UAS analysis studies to support potential future UAS acquisitions on Cutter-based and land-based UAS proof-of-concept flight demonstrations. UAS programs in USCG are being re-evaluated and molded to available technology appropriate to Coast Guard missions, possible joint UAS acquisitions, and operations with Customs & Border Protection.

So with our coolest toy on ice, what does that leave us? Well we have the more expensive HC-130J and HC-144A as well as the rotary winged upgrades. As now the Coast Guard seems to be behind schedule, but moving forward on all of these projects. Though it should be noted that "being behind" on the '130' project should not be considered when discussing Acquisition Directorate (a.k.a. "Deepwater") shortfalls. If you recall, and I'm sure most of you don't, the '130' wasn't supposed to be part of the program in the first place. To make a really long story short, the CG acquired them separate of any existing contract really discussed in the realm of Deepwater, but was later brought into the mix to streamline newer assets... I digress.

Currently the '130' and '144' are getting to where we need them to go. Scuttlebutt has it the C-130J Aircraft Project Office (APO) is in their prime and could begin to cease operation as early as this summer and begin picking up the workload from Air Station Elizabeth City. This of course is far from being substantiated, but it's moving in the right direction. And sorry, I don't have any scuttlebutt on the Ocean Sentry program, so if any of you out there could shed some light on where these bad boys will be going, that would be great.

So where does this put us in the now. News this past week out of the Acquisition Directorate office is as such: Last Monday (March 10, 2008) the CG accepted the first Mission Systems Pallet (MSP) for the HC-144A "Ocean Sentry" Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). That's great... so exactly what is an MPA? I'm glad you asked, because CG-9 was nice enough to give us a definition:

Mission System Pallet is a roll-on, roll-off suite of electronic equipment that enables the aircrew to compile data from the aircraft's multiple integrated sensors and transmit and receive both classified "Secret"-level and unclassified information to other assets, including surface vessels, other aircraft, local law enforcement and shore facilities. With multiple voice and data communications capabilities, including UHF/VHF, HF, and Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM), the HC-144A will be able to contribute to a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) and Common Operating Picture (COP) through a networked Command and Control (C2) system that provides for data sharing via SATCOM. The aircraft is also equipped with a vessel Automatic Identification System, direction finding equipment, a surface search radar, an Electro-Optical/ Infra-Red system, and Electronic Surveillance Measures equipment to improve situational awareness and responsiveness.

Wow, that's a mouth-full, but if it, and the potential waterside vessels, work, all is good. So the Ocean Sentry is moving along.

On to the HC-130J- To date we have one (1), yes, one, working, as in fully missionized, HC-130J aircraft. In fact, it just came off the line this last month with the CG taking possession of it on Leap Year day (you know, that could become a Service Wide Exam question). So lets back up here and bring everyone up to date. The C-130J APO came into existence in 2003 with the sole mission of getting stock USAF H-130J's ready for CG service, while, at the same time getting CG personnel ready for the 130J program. Since then there have been several set-backs to included funding, destruction of a hanger (reg), funding, and funding/Deepwater. And now, six years later, we got our first working aircraft. And by working I mean missionized. In a very short answer, here is what the CG got for it's money:

The new HC-130J model provides the Coast Guard capabilities that will greatly enhance its ability to perform its missions. Two essential features of the new modification are the nose-mounted forward-looking infrared (FLIR)/ electro optical (EO) sensor, and belly-mounted multi-mode radar (MMR). The 360-deghttp://draft.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gifree belly MMR is the first of its kind on a HC-130 aircraft.

During one of the aircraft's test flights the test team illustrated the interoperability of its features by selecting an automatic identification system (AIS) target on the mission system operator display that was approximately 22 miles from the aircraft. They then used the EO/IR sensor to immediately lock on the target. The EO/IR system maintained a lock on the target until the aircraft was close enough to make a positive identification.

I'll be glad to see when all six of the "J's" are done, we can only go forward from there.

From fixed wing to rotary wing. No, the CG isn't buying any new helo's, but the upgrades are in full swing. First up is the HH-65 Dolphin (English spelling); not a lot to say as the upgrade of all 95 aircraft from the HH-65B to HH-65C's have been completed. The process started in August 2004 and ended this past October 2007. Next up for the Dolphin is the Airborne Use of Force (AUF) and National Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) upgrades. Once complete they will all be given a new, end of name designator of MCH, denoting their multi-mission capabilities.

And for the HH-60J HH-60T "Jayhawk;" That's right, we're dropping the J. From CG-9:

The U.S. Coast Guard began converting its 42 legacy HH-60J aircraft to MH-60Ts in January 2007. The first HH-60J conversion to the MH-60T prototype was completed in June 2007. As of 5 December, approximately 40 of 100 Instrument Meteorological Condition (IMC) certification flight hours have been completed at AR&SC on MH-60T CG6027.

We are also dazzled by CG-9 with the continued description:

A new CAAS Cockpit [pictured] will include five multi-functional display, or MFD screens, which allow both pilots to view a multitude of options. The Coast Guard Avionic Selection and Placement team preferred a full screen display of Radar, Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and hoist camera images which led to a slight modification from the split-screen option used by the Army.

Well I think we all get the picture that the aviation side of the Acquisition Directorate is going fairly smooth, so far as the media is aware anyways. If you have anything to add to this, fell free to drop us a line or comment.

Posted on Monday, March 17, 2008
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Labels: Acquisition Directorate, Aviation, by Ryan Erickson, Deepwater

Saturday, March 15, 2008

This is successful spin
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

I don't know how I missed this article, Security affecting new Coast Guard fleet, from UPI earlier this week where they wrote,

Coast Guard officials acknowledged the program had many "challenges" in the past but said the U.S. government officially accepted the cutter for operation Monday.

Wow. Did I miss something, or did the UPI journalist take it hook, line, and sinker?

Posted on Saturday, March 15, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Is it possible to spin trivia?
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

I continue to be fascinated with this past week's Tuesday press teleconference. It must have felt like high school freshman debate all over again: Resolved, everything the Washington Times prints by David Axe is flat wrong.

Mr. Axe responded on his blog, War is Boring, saying the rear admirals primarily disputed three points from his article:

• They said the Coast Guard has just 42,000 people, not 50,000 as he reported.
• The delay would be just three months, not six.
• The radios are not the problem.

Since only representatives from the main stream media were offered a place on the call, and since the Coast Guard doesn't see fit to archive and post press teleconferences on the web (as the DOD does with their Blogger Roundtables), I can only guess that these were the three main points of Mr. Axe's article disputed during the teleconference.

42K is the number of active duty military; 50K would include the eight thousand reservists who are also part of the military. A better number might have been 58,000 or so, to count civilian employees. With Mr. Axe, I only feel singly slighted; with the admirals' numbers, I'm doubly slighted.

As to the schedule issue, the point goes to Mr. Axe. Try this on from the GAO report:

The first NSC was initially projected for delivery in 2006, but slipped to August 2007 after the 9/11 requirements changes. However, delivery was again delayed until April 2008. It is uncertain at this time whether the new delivery date will be met due to several factors involving testing, certifications, and other areas of technical risk.

As to the use of the term radio, I'm drawn back to the GAO report which says,

TEMPEST inspection: An inspection of a ship’s ability to ensure that data-related or intelligence-bearing signals will not be unintentionally radiated from equipment and the ship's structure is known as a TEMPEST (Telecommunications Electromagnetic Performance and Emission Standards) inspection. TEMPEST inspections are intended to identify the potential for such an occurrence through communications systems or any equipment or system that processes classified information in an electrical form. Inspectors may conduct visual and instrumented inspections.

Mr. Axe writes in his blog,

I said the problems were with radios. Technically, the problem is with this aforementioned C4ISR suite, a common design of which is installed on all new Coast Guard platforms, including cutters, airplanes and shore stations. What we’re talking about here is network gear and communications. For a newspaper with a lay readership, that means “radio.” The Washington Times does not use the term “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance suite.” Jeez.

Okay, technically, Mr. Axe is incomplete; however, I give him the point for making something complex a little easier for Joe Civilian to understand.

This round, at least for those three issues, does, indeed, go to Mr. Axe. Sorry, Admirals.

And, let me say that I really hope a I land a job this season in an independent school so I can teach debate. And, I'll bet there's a gaggle of flag officers, too, who hope I land a job in an independent school. ;-)

Posted on Saturday, March 15, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Still slow: 24 hours doesn't really help at all
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

I posted yesterday that I found it slightly confusing that messages which has been canceled were not removed from the official message site.

And then today I saw (again) this nugget of a quote attributed to "Coastie spokesman Jim McPherson" at War is Boring:

The problem before was these messages were informally shared and sometimes they were inaccurate. They were not updated and when they where superseded, it was overlooked. The goal now is to have the uscg.mil site the PRIMARY official source on these important issues … NOT the only place to see it. When you see it posted on uscg.mil it is official … not a draft, not superseded policy, etc. The responsibility is ours to make sure superseded policies are removed and the information is current and official. We want the information shared from this site. (Emphasis mine and not in the original.)

It might be time to clue-in the watchstanders at the Headquarters communications center of the expectations...

Or perhaps the expectations ought to be changed.

Either way, is now a good time to put a plug in for originator PLADS, message date time groups, and full RSS feeds? No. No? Okay, forget it.

Already have, eh?

Posted on Saturday, March 15, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

The problem with spin...
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

... is that it's best left to the professionals.

I'm finding the GAO report very interesting to read.

But first, coverage from the press teleconference held this past Tuesday with Rear Admiral Blore.

Bettina H. Chavanne at Aviation Week writes USCG Responds To Concerns Over New Cutter:

Published accusations March 11 blamed the NSC's schedule delays on problems with radios and command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment. Admiral Gary Blore, assistant commandant for acquisition, flatly denied the charges. "Any modest delays here recently have largely been machinery related or getting propulsion systems finished," Blore told reporters. "[Delays were not due] to C4ISR components."

From page 5 of the GAO report we learn,

The Coast Guard has identified 13 issues pertaining to C4ISR and Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical as risk areas, 8 of which have moderate to high risk of occurrence or impact if not resolved. One of these relates to the results of the July 2007 visual TEMPEST inspection, conducted by a team of Coast Guard officials. The team reported hundreds of discrepancies, over 40 percent of which pertain to cable grounding and separation, such as cables intended for classified information not being adequately separated from those intended for nonclassified information. Coast Guard officials told us that they requested the test be done earlier than usual so that issues could be identified and corrected sooner.

From Alice Lipowicz at FCW writes Cutter shows Deepwater progress, Coast Guard says: Rear Admiral Gary Blore, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition, and Rear Admiral Ronald Rabago, Deepwater Program Executive Officer

said that although the Bertholf was preliminarily scheduled for acceptance at the end of February, the date was pushed back to late April or early May due primarily to problems with launch-and-recovery apparatus and safety equipment, not the C4ISR systems. Furthermore, cost projections for the Bertholf already anticipated acceptance in late April, they said.

In the GAO report (again on page 5), we read

The first NSC was initially projected for delivery in 2006, but slipped to August 2007 after the 9/11 requirements changes. However, delivery was again delayed until April 2008. It is uncertain at this time whether the new delivery date will be met due to several factors involving testing, certifications, and other areas of technical risk.

Machinery trials occurred in early December and builder’s trials occurred February 8 - 11, 2008. The current schedule leaves little margin for delay. Acceptance trials are scheduled to begin April 7, 2008. The contract requires 30 days between acceptance trials and ship delivery, but the scheduled dates for these events are about 3 weeks apart. The Coast Guard and the contractor are aware of the discrepancy; however, no decision has been made on how to resolve this issue. The Coast Guard will have to either extend the delivery date of the ship to meet the requirement or waive it. Our prior work has shown that event-driven rather than schedule-driven decisions are preferable, thus it may be in the best interest of the Coast Guard to delay acceptance of the first NSC until a number of these issues are resolved.

Got it.

In her article, Ms. Lipowicz writes,

In addition, Blore and Rabago disputed claims that there were delays related to the C4ISR systems. They said it is routine for the Coast Guard to accept delivery of a ship and then take several weeks or months to test for and correct, C4ISR-related problems before granting the ship certification for full mission capability.

In recent months, the Coast Guard has been doing preliminary testing on the Bertholf’s C4ISR suite, and the contractors have fixed 80 percent of the problems discovered to date, Rabago said.

That bloody GAO report says,

Of the 987 certification standards, ICGS was to submit documentation on 892 for review and acceptance by the Coast Guard Technical Authority. Almost all remain outstanding.

I'm afraid I'm getting the picture.

I don't know. Is it possible they should have just left well enough alone and not even responded to the Washington Times article? I'm just seeing the hole get deeper and deeper.

Posted on Saturday, March 15, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Wednesday, March 5, 2008

More press about Deepwater
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Back in 1995 when the Deepwater Mission Analysis Report was published, I took a typical cynical view. Typically cynical because Coasties are typically cynical...

Anyway, here was my thinking: Of course the work group was going to confirm "that the Coast Guard would continue to have deepwater responsibilities well into the future." Why did I think it was a no brainer? Because the people who did the analysis were Academy graduates, all of whom had served on cutters just out of the Academy. It's what they knew. Shore ops was a bastard child. Marine safety was even more of a bastard child. The group looking at the question had stood Ocean Station watches for goodness sake. It was a forgone conclusion, so my cynical self thought, that the Service would put long-legged surface assets as the premier need for the Coast Guard. It wasn't quite the fox guarding the hen house, but...

Just this afternoon, a shipmate was telling me that there was a project team from the Research & Development Center conducting a needs analysis of the Deepwater project. He told me they'd met, but he didn't tell me that the initial report was finished. It is.

From Philip Ewing at Defense News: Report: Coast Guard May Need Fewer Big Cutters.

An internal U.S. Coast Guard report has reaffirmed many of the lifesaving service's choices about which vessels and aircraft it plans to buy, and what's more, the report suggests that if officials buy an especially capable new variety of ship, they might not need to buy as many new national security cutters as they initially planned. But the report seemed to reinforce worries about the Coast Guard's ability to manage the command and communications systems aboard its new assets.

Navy Times on March 5 obtained the executive summary of the Coast Guard's Deepwater "Alternatives Analysis," ordered last year by Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen in response to criticism of alleged mismanagement and waste in the Deepwater recapitalization portfolio.

I'd love to see the full report, but I'm willing to bet that any FOIA request will be met with a decision the report is an internal, pre-decisional document and, thus, is exempt from release under the Act.

And, please don't think we don't need to recapitalize our big, white fleet. We do. The current high endurance cutters and medium endurance cutters are falling apart, being held together by duct tape and bubble gum. (For the literalists reading, please note that the duct tape and bubble gum comment is hyperbole.) I guess the question is how capable do the cutters need to be, and how many do we need. Does the Coast Guard want a fleet of Kia Rio, Ford Taurus, or Toyota Avalon cars? If we buy something using all the greatest new technology, are we willing to carry the cost of maintaining the vessel?

How many bells and whistles do we need?

I don't know, but I just think the Coast Guard has worked itself into quite a pickle, and Admiral Allen and company are holding the bag. Everybody who made the decisions to bring us here are gone.

Meantime, it's nice to know that the Coast Guard is not alone in making tough decisions. From the Navy Times: Fearing fighter gap, Navy mulls new jet buy. Philip Ewing (again) tells us,

The Navy is considering buying 69 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters to bridge a “strike-fighter gap” that commanders fear could imperil aviation readiness at a time when older jets are wearing out before new aircraft are ready to take their place, top service officials said Wednesday.

As a reminder the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is a Boeing product. The next generation fighter, the F-35 is built by Lockheed Martin.

Er, ah, isn't the Coast Guard licking wounds because they contracted with Lockheed Martin for Deepwater?

I'm thinking the Navy ought to buy the Super Hornets...

Posted on Wednesday, March 05, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

More details on the Deepwater debacle facing the light of day
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

On Monday, World Politics Review published a story about the troubles with Deepwater: Cutter Delay is Latest Evidence of Systemic Problems with Coast Guard Ships. If you haven't read it, it is worth a read.

For a taste of the article:

Now it appears that the network vulnerabilities, and by extension many of Deepwater's most vexing problems, are rooted in a single illegal act by a Coast Guard official.

Ron Porter, a civilian Coast Guard employee, four years ago issued waivers to paper over known network problems with the 123-foot boats, according to Senate testimony by Jim Atkinson, a senior engineer with Massachusetts-based consulting firm Granite Island Group. Atkinson is one of the handful of engineers trained to inspect electronics equipment for compliance with the National Security Agency's "Tempest" emissions standards. Tempest ensures that enemy snoopers can't tap into U.S. communications. The Navy typically inspects new Coast Guard vessels for Tempest compliance before the shipbuilder hands them over for active service.

And there's more. Seems that the way the Deepwater contract was written, the systems developed for the 123s can be used on all other cutters developed. The flaws from the 123s were built into the BERTHOLF and will be built into other cutters delivered by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.

Mr. Atkinson is also quoted as saying,

The problem starts so far above Porter's grade, and goes back to the early days of the Coast Guard pushing the contractors to build the ships as quickly and as cheaply as possible, with minimal oversight. Porter could have stopped it, but he lacked the experience and the intestinal fortitude to do the right thing, which would have required that he stand up the commandant and tell him the ships were flawed.

For years, I've heard naval engineers, and others in the Service, complain that the entire Deepwater project was a void; no one outside the project knew anything about what was going on inside the project. It was all a huge secret.

Well, now we see where secrets will get us.

Posted on Wednesday, March 05, 2008
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Tuesday, February 26, 2008

The Navy Times reports "C4ISR problems could delay cutter construction"
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Over at the Navy Times, Philip Ewing writes about the national security cutter's information assurance woes in C4ISR problems could delay cutter construction. For regular readers of AN UNOFFICIAL COAST GUARD BLOG there are likely no surprises in Mr. Ewing's reporting, although he does seem to bolster some assertions and prognostications which have been made by bloggers and readers alike here. While I encourage you to read the entire article, I'll give you the part that raised my eyebrows:

Whether or not there are delays, the ship will be in “special commission status” when it enters the fleet, so that it can operate the systems it needs to get from the yard in Pascagoula, Miss., to its new homeport in Alameda, Calif. Until it satisfies the TEMPEST and information assurance requirements, the cutter cannot take on any Coast Guard missions.

Coast Guard officials have said they’re pleased with the way the Bertholf’s other systems, including its engines and weapons, performed on test trips into the Gulf of Mexico.

Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen, asked Feb. 14 after his annual state of the Coast Guard about the rumors of problems with the Bertholf, said he knew the cutter would only be able to take on its full mission set after it satisfied its “information assurance” requirements, but that he was confident the ship would be the lifesaving service’s best-ever first-in-class cutter.

[Capt. Leonard L. Ritter Jr. of the Office of Cyber Security and Telecommunications] said he believes that’s still the case.

“This is a: ‘here is the truth, we’re putting it out,’” Ritter said. “If we had published an article that said: ‘National security cutter, everything works on it, it’s the greatest thing since sliced bread’ — for one thing, everybody would rip that apart. But if you’re gonna say up front that, hey, this is a great cutter, it’s gone through builder’s trials and machinery trials, and actually it’s done pretty good on the systems that were operating then, and we’re really excited about adding this capability to our fleet. We know there are still some things to be worked on, but that’s not unusual, but we want people to know there are some things that need to be addressed, and we’re addressing them.”

I know the BERTHOLF isn't going to get up-to-snuff for a long time, but I'm still encouraged by Captain Ritter's comments.

Posted on Tuesday, February 26, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Is that smoke I see coming from the Second Deck?
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

There's good news... and bad news...

First the good news: CGBlog contributer John Willis, posting at Coast Guard News, lets us know that Admiral Thad Allen will be speaking at the National Press Club on February 8th. The topic of the luncheon talk is Honoring Our Past - Not Operating In It: Modernizing America’s Coast Guard to Meet Growing Demands. If he uses a slide presentation, you can bet it will be close to this one which is posted on the Commandant's website. This is the ppt from Admiral Allen's visit to Hampton Roads back in December; yes, that was the visit that I said I'd post about and then conveniently did nothing with the six pages of notes I'd taken. There's a story about how the ppt ended up posted on the Internet; perhaps I'll get around to telling it.

Before moving on to the bad news, a sidebar: I'm certain there's a bit of truth to this story, but let's call it apocryphal... When the Coast Guard was developing the 47-foot Motor Life Boat, the Service didn't use an off-the-shelf design (such as might be used by Britian's National Lifeboat Institute), but rather designed and built a somewhat cutting edge boat. And, being cutting edge, it had a few problems with it. One of the problems was that in a tight turn at speed, the boat had a tendency to roll over. Yes, it would pop back up, but that's not the sort of action one wants happening on a normal basis.

The naval architects thought that the entire design was going to need to be scrapped and Hull Number 1 would be a relic of someone's good intentions. It was bad. They didn't have a solution, but as the status was briefed up the chain of command, the news went from despair and failure to something else. By the time the Commandant received the status brief, he was told that with the new MLB had the opportunity the Coast Guard had an opportunity to increase the vessel's handling characteristics beyond anything ever done before.

Yes, they solved the problem, but it was touch and go for a while... and the organization's senior leader had no idea about the true status or the engineers' concerns.

Now the bad news: Is it possible that Admiral Allen is not receiving good counsel, that he is being kept in the dark about a number of issues, that he is not being told "truth to power" as he so often talks about?

Item one: The recent posts here about Mr. De Kort have generated some interesting comments, including this one from an anonymous commenter:

Does Admiral Allen know what is going on or is he hiding behind the plausible denial excuse? Ain't it convenient for him to look like the good guy but give out the dirty orders?

Perhaps the Coast Guard is trying a clever P.R. game and sending out this "disinformation". So when the builders and acceptance trials go real well the Coast Guard can really exceed expectations.

I don't think Admiral Allen is the type of leader to "hide behind the plausible denial excuse." Maybe I'm naive, but in my experience Thad Allen is anything but that type of person.

Item two: The reporting by Thomas Jackson at The Thomas Jackson Center for Equal Civil Rights has also provoked some interesting comments as well as shed light on gross underbelly of organizational management. Following a comment where I said, in part,

I have no doubt that once he sees a situation which he doesn't agree with, he will make it right, first by using the chain of command. Sometimes this is slow going, for sure.

In reply, Thomas Jackson wrote:

If Adm. Allen’s staff is keeping him isolated from issues such as this, and or he is aware but willing to trust in his advisors without question, then we have grave concerns.

Here are two instances where several outsiders are wondering if Admiral Allen is receiving the proper counsel. Is this a case of the Commandant being briefed that the Service has an opportunity to excel, while in truth the building is on fire?

Sir, we have an opportunity to really hone the EEO complaint process. We're treating our people poorly and the situation is a wreck as it is.

Sir, we have the chance to really do great things with the NSC. If the darn thing will stay afloat and not give away national secrets through TEMPEST infractions.

It might be time for the informal Allen network to provide truth to power. Adrian?

---

Photo with this post is an official Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer Sherri Eng.

Posted on Wednesday, January 30, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater, Opinion

Catastrophe for Deepwater?
Posted by Peter A. Stinson

Say it ain't so: About Mr. De Kort's receipt of recognition from the IEEE, David Axe at Wired writes this morning,

Kind words, but Cummings perhaps speaks too soon. While the Coast Guard has learned lessons from the investigations DeKort helped launch, one of those lessons was how to cover its ass. If rumors are true, the service is considering rejecting the first of the 400-foot National Security Cutters -- the future crown jewels of the Coastie fleet -- because Northrop and Lockheed botched the design, construction and electronics all while insisting that everything was just dandy (pdf!).

But the Coast Guard is just as guilty. For years it let industry run its modernization programs while the service sat back and pretended that there wouldn't be problems. Rejecting the cutter, DeKort says, is the Coast Guard's way of distancing itself from the coming programmatic meltdown.

I doubt the CG is considering rejecting the NSC. Am I right? Or is Mr. Axe? Huge black eye for everyone if the NSC doesn't make it.

Posted on Wednesday, January 30, 2008
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Labels: by Peter Stinson, Deepwater